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PRODUCT APPEARANCE IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION-PREEMPTION OR PROTECTION?*
WHEN a producer seeks judicial relief from a competitor's alleged pirating
of the design or identifying feature of his product, and has been unable to secure
protection under a federal design patent, he may yet persuade a court to pro-
tect him from his competitor's allegedly underhanded behavior, on the basis
of doctrines derived from common-law unfair competition. One line of cases
would grant relief, both injunctive and in damages, against persons who can
be shown to have attempted to capitalize on the innovating producer's repu-
tation by "palming off" their products as those of the innovator. Another, based
upon state court expansion of principles suggested by the Supreme Court,
grants similar relief against a competitor who "misappropriates" the innova-
tor's product, selling it as his own. Perhaps prompted by the desire to find a
means of protecting innovators against copying where patent protection seems
inadequate, some courts have now stretched the boundaries of traditional unfair
competition to such an extent that they seem to trespass on a congressional
balance struck between free consumer choice and producer protection. Two
Seventh Circuit decisions, recently granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,'
raise interesting questions concerning the extent to which state law of unfair
competition may prohibit imitation of commercial product designs-the extent
to which state authorities may share control of the market place with federal.
In Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp.,2 defendant marketed copies of
plaintiff's industrial fluorescent lighting fixture. In Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co.,3 defendants sold copies of plaintiff's floor-to-ceiling pole lamp. In
both cases, plaintiffs held design patents on their products; in both cases, the
patents were declared invalid.4 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs succeeded in obtain-
ing injunctions against further imitation on the ground that defendants were
engaged in unfair competition as a matter of Illinois law.5
*Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Stiffel Co.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
1. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 83 Sup. Ct. 1868 (1963) ; Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 83 Sup. Ct. 1868 (1963).
2. 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
3. 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
4. In Day-Brlte the court found that the design was directed by the manufacturing
process and thus did not meet the standard of invention for a design patent. 311 F.2d at
28-29. In Stiffel the design was found to have been on the market for more than a year
before application for patent and was thus invalid because "anticipated in the prior art"
313 F.2d at 117.
5. 311 F.2d at 30; 313 F.2d at 118 n.7. Jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b)
(1958), which allows federal courts to hear unfair competition claims when "joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws."
Local law applies to claims of unfair competition and common-law trade-mark in-
fringement. Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942).
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These holdings are only the most recent evidence of extensions of the com-
mon-law protection against the imitation of product design. Traditionally, it
has been considered unfair competition for a merchant to "palm off" his prod-
uct as that of his competitor by using the competitor's trade name, if it could
be shown that the buying public associated that name with a single source and
bought the product because of its source. 6 It is the attempt to capitalize on
this public identification which constitutes the legally improper act. The notion
of unfair competition was extended to design copying on the theory that a
particular feature of a product may itself have acquired a capacity for identify-
ing its source to the consumer.7 Thus, when a competitor copies design ele-
ments which are relied upon by consumers as an indication of source, courts
have found actionable unfair competition.8
But design copying has not been proscribed as freely as trade name imita-
tion. Because courts have also been concerned with the importance of com-
petition and with ensuring a high degree of consumer choice, the traditional
doctrine places serious limitations on the availability of injunctions for trade
name or design imitation. Where identifying terms are concerned, distinctions
are drawn between generic words and words which are primarily identifiers of
a particular source. 9 Correspondingly, courts have distinguished between de-
sign features which are "functional"-a term of art which denotes, in addition
to usefulness, any feature of a product which in itself makes the product more
desirable to consumers 10-and those which are "nonfunctional"-a mere arbi-
trary embellishment to the product which may serve to identify its source."
Generally, courts have enjoined imitation only where the product design with
this identification characteristic is nonfunctional.' 2 In the instances in which
consumers rely upon functional design aspects-for example, the pink color of
Pepto-Bismol, 13 or the shape of a Zippo lighter 14-for source identification,
6. See 1 NIms, UNFAIR ComPrTITIoN AND TRADE-mARKs § 37 (4th ed. 1947).
7. Id. § 134, at 370-71.
8. Ibid.
9. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111-18 (1938); 1 Nmts, op. cit.
supra note 6, § 41.
10. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa.
1938), aff'd, 106 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1939). See generally 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 6,
§ 134, at 375; Developments in the Law-Trade-marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HAv.
L. Rrv. 814, 856 (1955).
11. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Crescent Tool Co.
v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917). See 1 Nnss, op. cit. supra note 6,
at §§ 116-33.
12. See Pollack, Unfair Trading By Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle?, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 74, 76 (1962) ; Note, 72 HARv. L. Erv. 1520, 1527-28 (1959).
13. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
14. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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imitation is tolerated. But the imitator will be required by the court to take
reasonable steps to distinguish himself from the other source.15
Thus, in the absence of legislation, courts have opted for a doctrine which
permits competitors to offer substantially the same products to consumers.'0
Although it is frequently difficult to distinguish between nonfunctional and
functional aspects of a product,"t common-law doctrines of unfair competition
insist that the distinction be drawn, in the interests of a specific social policy
fostering product competition.' 8 The only limit imposed on imitation, in the
name of proscribing "unfair competition," is directed to imitation of a com-
petitor's identity. This limitation is required if the general desideratum of
competition is to be obtained. Only if a consumer can exercise choice among
rival producers or vendors, by identifying a product's source or sponsorship,
can the judgment of the competitive market place be effectuated. 19
A preliminary objection to the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Day-Brite and
Stiffel is that the court found enjoinable unfair competition without inquiring
into actual consumer reliance upon the duplicated design elements as an in-
dication of preferred source.20 It awarded relief to plaintiffs solely on the basis
15. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., supra note 14, at 697; J. C. Penny Co.
v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941); Champion Spark Plug Co.
v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 741(b)
(ii) (1938).
16. See Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1317-18 (1940); Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); American Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1960) (de-
cision for plaintiff on other grounds) ; Rahl, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values,
23 Onia ST. L.J. 56, 71-72 (1962).
17. Pollack, mpra note 12, at 77.
18. See Rahl, supra note 16, at 71-72; 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 6, § 13, at 79;
§ 134, at 373-75.
19. See 1 Nuxs, op. cit. supra note 6, § 187; Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social
Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 173, 180 (1949) ; Comment, Quality
Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1174-78
(1963).
20. [I]t is ... an absolute condition precedent to any relief whatever that the plain-
tiff... show that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that some
particular person ... makes them, and that the public cares who does make them,
and not merely for their appearance and structure....
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917) (L. Hand,
J-).
Accord, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir.
1960) ; Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 270
(7th Cir. 1943); Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172,
173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d
450 (7th Cir. 1939). See generally Stern, Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in
Unfair Competition and Trademark Cases, 32 CoNN. BAR J. 381 (1958). But cf. 3 CALL-
mAN, THE LAw oF UNFA IR COMPETIoN AND TRADEMARKS § 80.5 (2d ed. 1950).
There is a line of cases which seem to support a theory that relief will be given if the
imitation of a product is likely to cause confusion, even in the absence of a showing that
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of a showing that the goods were confusingly similar in appearance.21 But,
even if consumers were confused as to source, it need not follow that consumers
bought one product because of its source. The consumers may have been in-
different to the source of the pole lamps or fluorescent lights. Indeed, the
opinion in Stiffel indicated that Sears, Roebuck was marketing a pole lamp
identical to Stiffel's at a substantially lower price, and that consumers seemed
to prefer the cheaper copy to the original.22
The Seventh Circuit seemed to recognize that it was shifting from the tradi-
tional standard, requiring a showing that consumer purchases stemmed from
identification of design element with a desired source.23 It sought to find justi-
fication for dispensing with the element of consumer motive in favor of a hold-
ing that only a likelihood of consumer confusion as to source need be shown,
by analogy from a parallel development in the Illinois law of trade names.2 4
The attempt may have been prompted by a combination of circumstances: the
mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 25 to a federal court sitting on law matters
and the fact that the question presented by Stiffel and Day-Brite had not arisen
in Illinois courts.26 But the difference between trade name protection and de-
sign protection may be so fundamental in terms of the effect on competition,
that the extension of the standard by analogy is improper. Even if confusingly
similar trade names on competing products are prohibited, the consumer will
not be short-changed: competing producers may still put before him a host of
identical products under different names. In product imitation cases, on the
other hand, each relaxation of proof requirements upon the producer seeking
exclusivity for his wares is likely to reduce the number of like products offered
to consumers. In Stiffel and Day-Brite, the Seventh Circuit extended the com-
mon-law unfair competition doctrine to deprive consumers of goods they
the imitated features are associated with source in the minds of the buying public. 3 CALL-
w , op. cit. supra, § 77.4(e)2, at 1259-60. The better view, it is submitted, is that taken
by Prof. E. H. Pollack-that these cases do not constitute anything more than a "pro-
cedural variation of the majority rule" and cannot be distinguished substantively. Pol-
lack, supra note 12, at 86-95.
21. 311 F.2d at 29; 313 F2d at 118.
22. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963). And see
Appendix to Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 53-54.
23. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962);
Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra note 22, at 118 n.7.
24. Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 I1l. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754 (1941) ; Lady Esther,
Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943). See
generally CHICAGO BA a Ass'N, THE LAW OF COmTmTION IN ILLIs 78-85 (1962).
The Court rejected its own relevant precedents in the area of product imitation (see
Seventh Circuit cases cited at note 20 supra) in favor of past Seventh Circuit trade name
cases developed on the Illinois state trend. See, e.g., Independent Nail & Packing Co.
v. Stronghold Screw Products, Inc., 205 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1953); Radio Shack Corp.
v. Radio Shack, Inc., 180 F2d 200 (7th Cir. 1950).
25. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. There is dictum in an 1870 Illinois trade name case which states a policy condon-
ing extensive product copying. Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 IIl. 439, 461 (1870).
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probably purchased for bargain rather than for source. It is questionable
whether this use of the doctrine can be justified as protecting any substantial
consumer interest.
A more serious objection to the Seventh Circuit's decision arises from its
failure to consider the distinction between "functional" and "nonfunctional"
aspects of design in framing its relief. Despite indications that both cases in-
volved functional aspects of design,27 the court, ignoring the distinction, re-
quired both defendants wholly to cease marketing their imitative products.2s
But if the copied features were functional, the remedy most consonant with
the common-law policy of protecting competition in similar products would
have been to allow the defendants to continue manufacture and sale, but to
require them to label their products more clearly, so that source confusion
would be eliminated.29 By virtue of the full injunctive remedies granted, both
cases present in classic outline the problem of increasing overlap between com-
mon-law principles of unfair competition and federal regulation of market
practices through the patent and antitrust laws.30 This overlap may have been
prompted to some degree by the frequency with which patent protection is
denied-particularly in the case of design patents.3 ' After such failure, a pro-
ducer naturally may be expected to look to the development of common-law
remedies which will immunize his market from the intrusion of competition.
Courts sympathetic to the producer's plea for effective protection of his inno-
vations will respond. 32 Perhaps reflecting such sympathies, both cases present
the curious spectacle of the state law of unfair competition replacing and ex-
ceeding federal patent law in granting relief to producers seeking a product
monopoly on the basis of their purported innovations.
The spectacle is of recent birth. When, in 1938, the Supreme Court last
considered an unfair competition case treating product imitation, in Kellogg
27. In Day-Brite, the design patent was held invalid because the design was functional
in the sense that it was dictated by the manufacturing process. 311 F.2d at 28.
In Stiffel there was evidence that the design innovation had a great impact on the
trade and was moving toward a mass market. This would seem to indicate functionality
in the sense of customer appeal. 313 F.2d at 118.
Aside from the question of customer appeal, it would seem that there would be some
features of a floor-to-ceiling lighting fixture essential to the genus ."pole lamp" which,
barring patent protection, are free to be imitated.
28. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 29 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Ap-
pendix to Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 351, Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313
F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
29. See authorities cited at note 15 supra.
30. See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 277-82 (2d Cir. 1959)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1960) ; Pollack, A Projection for the
Revaluation of Unfair Competition, 13 OHio ST. L.J. 187, 222-26 (1952).
31. See Note, 72 HFv. L. REv. 1520, 1521-24 (1959); Note, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 902,
904-05 (1959). S. 776, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), recently passed by the Senate, would
provide a design registration system with greatly relaxed standards of originality and
inventiveness.
32. See Note, 72 HAv. L. REv. 1520, 1528 (1959); Note, 59 COLUm. L. Rnv. 902,
906 (1959) (extra-legal attempts to protect products).
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Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,33 it could portray unfair competition law in the
traditional terms related above. In Kellogg, respondent sought protection for
both the name of its product-shredded wheat-and the distinctive shape in
which it was manufactured. 34 The Court, denying protection, explicitly in-
dicated that consumers' interests in free imitation were to be preferred to pro-
ducers' interests in guarding exclusive markets for their products.3 5 In these
circumstances, the Court did not find it necessary to hold that this result was
dictated by considerations of pre-emption, although its presentation of the
federal common law of unfair competition, which it assumed to be the same
as current state law, reflected an interdependence between common-law and
statutory protections.3 6 Since Kellogg, however, there have been persistent
movements to expand the law proscribing product imitation beyond that ex-
pressed in Kellogg. Just as the Seventh Circuit in Day-Brite purported to rest
its analysis on considerations of "old fashioned honesty," 37 other courts
prompted by the same notions have applied, as a branch of unfair competition
law, the doctrine of "misappropriation." 38 Under both approaches the result is
the same; product imitations are broadly restrained. The Supreme Court could
fruitfully use the Seventh Circuit opinions in Day-Brite and Stiffel as occa-
sions for considering the propriety of these general attempts to expand state
remedies for product imitation against the backdrop of federal legislation.
33. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
34. Patents on the machines used to make shredded wheat had expired, and a design
patent on the shape of the shredded wheat biscuit had previously been held invalid. 305
U.S. at 119 n.4.
35. It is urged that all possibility of deception, or confusion would be removed if
[defendant] . . . should refrain from using the name "Shredded Wheat" and adopt
some form other than the pillow-shape. But the name and form are integral parts
of the goodwill of the article. To share fully in the goodwill [defendant] . . . must
use the name and the pillow-shape. And in the goodwill, [defendant] . . . is as free
to share as the plaintiff.... Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.
Id. at 121-22.
36. Id. at 113 n.1.
37. Indeed, in Day-Brite, the heart of the Seventh Circuit's indictment of the defendant
appears to rest here; the court stated
... several choices of ribbing were apparently available to meet the functional
needs of the product. The defendant did not avail itself of the other type but in-
stead chose precisely the same design used by the plaintiff .... The essence of
"unfair competition" is that it be unfair, that "in all cases of unfair competition, it
is principles of old fashioned honesty which are controlling."
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962).
38. The most notable example is Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956). See Stem & Hoffman,
Public Injury and the Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Com-
petition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935, 941, 969 (1962).
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Advocates of state restraint on product imitation may argue that pre-Erie
decisions of federal courts permitted a federal common law of unfair competi-
tion to exist, despite overlap with the policy declared, inter alia by the federal
patent laws, and that state common law should be no more narrowly treated.
The strongest support for this argument appears to arise from the Supreme
Court's promulgation of the misappropriation doctrine in International News
Service v. Associated Press 39-a case in which the competitor, I.N.S., was
barred from copying and marketing A.P. news releases while they still had
commercial value. But, although there are dicta of considerable breadth in the
opinion,40 the case on its facts is strongly reminiscent of common-law conver-
sion. The true "product" marketed by the A.P. was the intangible "service"
of making news available, rather than the tangible news releases themselves. 41
Thus the I.N.S., in copying the releases and selling them, was doing more
than imitating the type of services performed by the A.P.; the I.N.S. was
taking A.P.'s intangible "product" and selling it as its own. And when the
argument was made by producers that the dicta should be expansively inter-
preted, to provide the broad protection against copying now characteristic of
some courts' use of the misappropriation doctrine,42 it met formidable opposi-
tion. In 1929, Judge Learned Hand said for the Second Circuit, in Cheney
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,4 3 that reliance on a broad misappropriation doctrine
arising from I.N.S. v. A.P. was misplaced; he suggested that common-law
remedies might be seriously limited by relevant federal legislation. Judge Hand
stated that, if the argument for a broad reading of I.N.S. v. A.P. were to pre-
vail, the court must:
. . . suppose that the [Supreme Court] meant to create a sort of
common-law patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would
flagrantly conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a
century devised to cover the subject-matter.
To exclude others from the enjoyment of a chattel is one thing;
to prevent any imitation of it, to set up a monopoly in the plan of its
39. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
40. [D]efendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has been
acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant
in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not
sown, and . . . is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with
the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit
from those who have earned it to those who have not...
248 U.S. at 239-40.
41. It has been suggested that "intangible services" is the key to distinguishing cases
where the misappropriation doctrine may or may not be validly applied. Rahl, The Right
to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 Onio ST. L.J. 56, 57-67 and passim (1962).
42. See authorities cited at note 38 mipra.
43. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
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structure, gives the author a power over his fellows vastly greater, a
power which the Constitution allows only Congress to create. 44
In addition to using the federal patent and copyright laws to construe away
the expansive I.N.S. v. A.P. dicta, Judge Hand may have been indicating that
the Constitution, through the patent clause,45 has an inhibiting effect on the
ability of judges to "create a sort of common-law patent or copyright...."
This reading of I.N.S. v. A.P., far from supporting expanded state protection
by federal common-law precedent, indicates that this expansion is prohibited
even to the federal courts. It argues for, rather than against, pre-emption. At
the least, Judge Hand's reasoning would prevent state legislation and common-
law development which restrained product imitation to a greater extent than
limitations on producer action derived from congressional statutes. It recog-
nizes that the result of producer monopoly sanctioned by the patent clause is
an exception to the overall pattern encouraging producer competition in the
national economy.46 The exception is tolerated only "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts" and the decision as to what constitutes protectible
activity is vested in Congress 47 When protection is afforded through applica-
tion of unfair competition doctrines, promotion of progress is no longer a cri-
terion: it is the producer's identity, not his inventiveness, that is being pre-
served and rewarded. Furthermore, when protection is afforded under the
constitutional grant, it is for only "limited times," 48 in recognition of the
necessity that even patented ideas must eventually be dedicated to the public.
When a remedy is formulated under common-law principles, the market shelter
given the producer is usually of unlimited duration.49 In Day-Brite and Stiffel,
the court, by granting protection against limitation for an indefinite period of
time, gave an exclusive market for the same features of the product to which
44. Id. at 280.
45. The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
- 46. A federal patent is available to anyone who invents a "new, original and orna-
mental design." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1958). The courts have required high levels of inventive-
ness and originality. See, e.g., Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 681 (1893) ;
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950). See generally, authorities cited at note 32 supra. Because patent privileges are
restrictive of the free market function, they are strictly construed. See United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) ; Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 92 (1941).
47. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 1, 17-21 (1829); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 171 (1896); Chafee, Unfair CoMpetition, 53 HM. L.
REv. 1289, 1318 (1940); BARNETT, PATENT PROPERTY AND THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS
20-22 (1943).
48. A design patent may be obtained for up to fourteen years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1958).
49. See, e.g., Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 Fed.
979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1911).
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Congress had denied protection, and to which it could have agreed to extend
protection for only a limited time. Congressional judgment concerning the
degree to which it is socially desirable to protect product originators, despite
inhibition of market place competition, is thus superseded; by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, state law which establishes a different
balance should give way.
Pre-emption as a solution to problems of state-federal relationships always
poses problems of breadth. What activities of the state fall within the ban of
supremacy? Arguably, federal law completely pre-empts the regulatory field,
preventing states from granting even relief consonant with that available under
the patent program.cr No patent right existed at common law ;51 the power to
grant patents lay only in the sovereign and was a matter of grace.52 Prior to
the explicit grant of such power to Congress by the Constitution, the states
had exercised such sovereign power, but their grants were of little value.53
And the importance of a national policy concerning the prevalence of eco-
nomic concentration in the market place might reaffirm a need for centrally
established regulation. The discouraging experience with state competency 4
and the complexity of procedural and substantive standards in the patent
area VG might leave unmistakable the conclusion that federal regulation is "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it."56
Federal pre-emption in regard to patent protection does not mean, how-
ever, that states will be totally divested of a regulatory power in the consumer
area. Design patent laws and statutes of that ilk do not deal with the problem
of consumer deception--of confusion as to source. And here the functional-
50. A well considered argument for federal supremacy is advanced in an amincus
curiae brief recently filed by the United States in the Day-Brite and Stiffel cases. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., appeal
docketed, No. 106, U.S. Sup. Ct. O.T. 1963; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., appeal
docketed, No. 108, U.S. Sup. Ct. O.T. 1963, passim.
51. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591, 656, 658 (1834) (copyright case);
Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. (51 U.S.) 477, 494 (1850); 2 WA.LnR, PATENTS § 220, at
1162 (Deller ed. 1937).
52. See generally 1 WAL ER, PATENTS §§ 1-5 (Deller ed. 1937).
53. Id. § 7, at 28.
54. The patent power came to rest in the federal government early in the nation's
life. See INLow, THE PATENT GRANT 44 (1950). No doubt this was prompted by the
Patent Act of 1793, which made relinquishment of any prior state rights a prerequisite to
obtaining federal protection. 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793).
55. See, e.g., 4 Waa=, PATENTS (Deller ed. 1937) (entire volume devoted to plead-
ing, practice and forms) ; 2 id. cl. IX, "The Patent Application."; 1 id. (entire volume
devoted to substantive requirements for patent).
56. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1955), rehearing denied, 351 U.S.
934 (1956) (quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)),
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66, 67, 73-74 (1941) ; cf. Sperry v. Florida, 373
U.S. 379 (1963).
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nonfunctional distinction abandoned by the Seventh Circuit recurs. Those ele-
ments of a design which hold promise of inherent appeal to the purchasing
public fall within the scope of federal patent laws; consequently, the decision
to grant or deny monopoly control should be made by the federal government.
But protection of nonfunctional elements of design signifying source, the
chief concern of traditional common-law doctrine, does not raise questions
of product monopoly.57 Nor does the limited protection given by traditional
common-law doctrines to producer-identifying functional aspects offend or in-
terfere with federal patent protection. Federal law does not foreclose injunctive
relief against copying of nonfunctional aspects of design which serve to identify
source; neither does it prevent state courts from requiring clearer labeling
where functional aspects of design have been imitated with a resultant likeli-
hood of consumer confusion. The courts which have acted under the revived
misappropriation doctrine and the Seventh Circuit in Day-Brite and Stiffel
have overlooked the fact that the producer's right to his commercial identity
arises from the common-law policy of protecting consumer choice. These courts
have abstracted and extended the producer's right to the point where it in-
hibits rather than aids the exercise of consumer choice in the product market,
as measured by the balance established by federal law.
57. See authorities cited at note 11 supra.
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